and Sandler, 1993) . Seventh, terrorism can influence the outcome of national elections (Gassebner et al., , 2011 .
The primary purpose of this paper is to apply modern principal component analysis to identify common (worldwide) and idiosyncratic (country-specific) factors that influence transnational terrorism involving two or more countries. Our main goal is to identify any comovement of transnational terrorism across countries, which has not been previously investigated. Principal component analysis is a statistical method to estimate the most influenced common stochastic series by analyzing cross-sectional correlation. For our particular application, principal component analysis identifies if there are influences that commonly or generally affect the dynamic co-movement of transnational terrorist attacks in the sample countries. If one or more common factors are estimated, then we relate these factors to the transnational terrorist attacks in the sample countries to ascertain whether some countries' transnational terrorist campaigns drive attacks worldwide. Principal component analysis also indicates which countries' transnational terrorism is driven by considerations specific to them and, thus, independent of attacks occurring abroad. Such countries likely confront perpetrators who are not driven by grievances, ideologies, or resources shared with groups abroad -hence, the notion of idiosyncratic factors.
The principal component analysis here finds a single common factor for transnational terrorism during 1970-2007, which we then relate by our methodology to the transnational terrorist campaigns in some specific countries. In fact, all co-movements of transnational terrorism across countries are explained by just five countries' transnational terrorist attacks.
Among them, Lebanon's transnational terrorist attacks explain most of the worldwide comovement of transnational terrorism, with the other four countries -United States, Germany, Iraq, and the United Kingdom -explaining the remainder. The five core countries reflect, to different degrees, the influence of the leftist and fundamentalist terrorists, who have dominated transnational terrorism during this period (Hoffman, 2006; Rapoport, 2004) . These countries' transnational terrorist attacks may have had this common influence on worldwide transnational terrorism through a demonstration effect, shared grievances, common terrorist perpetrators (e.g., al-Qaida and Abu Nidal Organization), or assets (i.e., people and property) abroad. For example, US assets at home and abroad will attract terrorist attacks worldwide by terrorist groups with a grievance against US policy, thereby resulting in a cross-sectional dependence among some countries' transnational terrorist attacks. At times, this co-movement may have arisen from a country's foreign policy decisions -e.g., left-wing terrorists' reacted globally to the US-Vietnam War. For Lebanon, this co-movement may have stemmed, in part, from many resident terrorist groups that trained in Lebanon and attacked there and elsewhere. The findings also indicate which regions and countries are influenced by country-specific drivers. Transnational terrorismplagued Colombia is almost entirely influenced by idiosyncratic factors, as is Liberia, Nicaragua, Guyana, and Gabon.
The identification of common and idiosyncratic factors of transnational terrorism has important policy implications. The presence of a common driver suggests that any war on transnational terrorism requires some international collective action. Moreover, we also know which countries have the biggest stake in this collective action; namely, those countries that are most affected by the common factor. In contrast, countries primarily influenced by idiosyncratic factors have much less to gain from this international cooperation, since their transnational terrorism is not dynamically affected by transnational terrorist attacks abroad. By knowing the common drivers of transnational terrorism, the most-influenced countries will better understand where they need to concentrate their counterterrorism efforts. Future studies can apply other methods to establish the root causes of this cross-sectional dependence. Moreover, the results here raise a caution to panel studies (e.g., those investigating the adverse influence of terrorism on growth) that cross-sectional dependence must be taken into account for unbiased results. 1 The remainder of the paper contains five sections. Section II considers why transnational terrorist activities may be cross-sectionally correlated. In Section III, we present a procedure for determining the common factors of transnational terrorism. This procedure estimates the number of common factors and then identifies their underlying determinants in terms of countries' transnational terrorist campaigns. The data are presented in Section IV, followed by the empirical factor analysis of transnational terrorism in Section V. Section VI contains concluding remarks.
II. WHY TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ARE CROSS-SECTIONALLY

CORRELATED
There are many reasons to anticipate that transnational terrorist activities are crosssectionally correlated. Since the start of the modern era of transnational terrorism in 1968, terrorists have shared ideologies -the leftists sought to overthrow capitalist governments, while the fundamentalists have followed a fatwa issued against the "enemies" of Islam. These common ideologies and calls to action motivated terrorists to strike in concert against target countries. Some political events have simultaneously resulted in attacks in many countriese.g., a spate of terrorist attacks followed the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the US retaliatory raid against Libya in April 1986, the Gulf War in January 1991, and the Abu Ghraib prison revelations in April 2004 (Brandt and Sandler, 2009; Enders and Sandler, 1993) . Moreover, countries' attacks may be correlated owing to diverse terrorist groups receiving training in just a few countriescamps in Jordan, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Yemen trained terrorists since the 1970s (Alexander and Pluchinsky, 1992; Hoffman, 2006) . In the 1990s, al-Qaida established terrorist training camps in Afghanistan with the intent to strike the interests of a set of enemy countries at home and abroad. With concentrated training facilities, terrorists grew to share common modes of attack and distain for similar countries and alleged wrongs.
As targeted countries responded to attacks through defensive or protective measures, the terrorists reacted by seeking out softer targets where they could hit the protected countries' interests. Thus, terrorist attacks and the ensuing countermeasures in one country led to attacks in other less fortified countries (Enders and Sandler, 2006) . Cross-country correlations also arose because terrorists have cells in multiple countries -e.g., al-Qaida affiliates circle the globe.
Hezbollah and other Middle Eastern groups engaged in attacks outside of the region -e.g., Cross-country correlations of transnational terrorist attacks may also stem from terrorists copying successful attack innovations -e.g., suicide car bombings, first used in Lebanon in 1983, were later used elsewhere -e.g., Sri Lanka (Horowitz, 2010; Pedahzur, 2005) . Similarly, counterterrorism innovations can reduce terrorist incidents worldwide -e.g., the introduction of metal detectors in airports reduced greatly the number of skyjackings worldwide Sandler, 1993, 2012) . Additionally, state sponsorship of terrorism, beginning in the late 1970s, meant that terrorist acts in one country could be correlated with acts in other countries -e.g., the Abu Nidal Organization served as a terrorist group for hire for state sponsors and, as such, operated in many countries (Hoffman, 2006 ). This anticipated cross-sectional dependence means that transnational terrorism may best be dealt with by a set of targeted countries, because their actions will have spillover effects beyond their borders. To gauge this cross-sectional dependence, we apply approximate common factor analysis approach, which is explained in the next section.
III. COMMON FACTOR ANALYSIS OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
The co-movement of terrorism for the countries i and j can be captured by the correlation coefficient between the two countries' transnational terrorist attacks. Let it  be the number of terrorist attacks in country i at time t The co-movement of terrorist attacks in the two countries can then be statistically summarized by the following correlation statistic:
 is the mean and t = 1,...,T denotes the number of time periods. If there is no crosscountry dependence, which implies that the expectation of the sample covariance [numerator of Equation (1)] is zero, then transnational terrorism is purely country specific. However, there are many reasons to expect cross-country correlation across many countries (see Section II). Such co-movement of transnational terrorism across sovereign countries may be due to a few common or worldwide factors. We decompose annual transnational terrorist events in country i into
.
The common component is allowed to vary across countries, because the same common or worldwide component may affect terrorist activity for each country differently. The idiosyncratic component is uniquely associated with the country investigated. The decomposition of transnational terrorism into common and idiosyncratic components is novel to this literature. Hence, we now present an approximate common factor representation, which has been recently developed in econometrics.
The cross-correlation between transnational terrorist attacks in country i and those elsewhere in the world can be captured by the following simple latent model:
 is a country-specific or idiosyncratic component. In Equation (3), the second right-hand term represents the common component in Equation (2) . Equation (3)  is assumed to be negligible or zero. This approximate common factor model has been rapidly developed and is much more flexible than the classical factor analysis. The latter considers either the case of large T and a fixed number of countries, N, or the case of fixed T and a large number of countries, N. Moreover, classical factor analysis assumes that the number of common factors is usually known (see Anderson, 1984) . The approximate common factor model does not make these strong assumptions and provides well-developed asymptotic properties for the estimated common factors and factor loading coefficients.
To provide an economic interpretation for each stochastic component in the latent model, we first consider the overall covariance between terrorism in countries i and j given by
for each i and j. It is, however, not possible to identify uniquely the original factor loadings and factors, because we can always
Hence, we normalize the common factor such that
That is, the variance of st F is assumed to be unity for 1 s K    Given this normalization, we can now evaluate the economic meaning of factor loadings. Observe that
which implies that the overall covariance between the transnational terrorism of the two countries can be captured by factor loadings.
Next, consider the dynamic variation between transnational terrorism in two countries.
For convenience, assume that 1 K   Further suppose that the common factors during the first three periods are zeros, but that the common factor during the last period is unity That is,
  is randomly distributed. Then at 1 2 3 t     there will be no cross-correlated terrorism activity because the common factors are zeros even though 0 i    However, at time 4 t   transnational terrorism in country i is correlated with that in country j by
  The common factors, thus, provide a dynamic correlation structure across countries for transnational terrorism, given factor loadings. More important, the common factors for transnational terrorism become the dynamic source of worldwide terrorism. Of course, not all countries' transnational terrorism need display this cross correlation; e.g., the small amount of transnational terrorism in Iceland is unlikely to be correlated with worldwide terrorism activities.
The thorniest issue for either classical or approximate common factor analysis is the identification of the unknown common factors. Without knowledge of the source of the common factors, common factor analysis becomes a pure statistical exercise. In this paper, we extend this statistical exercise and identify the estimated common factors by using a novel method.
Typically, economists search beyond macroeconomic variables to explain common behaviors; e.g., empirical studies on the determinants of terrorism investigate economic, social, and political variables that are correlated with transnational terrorism (e.g., Abadie, 2006; Piazza, 2011) . We are not doing this here; rather, we are asking whether transnational terrorism campaigns in a few key countries are the drivers of transnational terrorism worldwide. Insofar as we do not know the core countries whose transnational terrorist activities influence the rest of the world, we are first using the approximate common factor model to estimate the common factors and then to identify the core countries. This novel approach is now explained in further detail.
A. Estimation of the Common Factors
All empirical studies on the approximate common factor models start with the estimation of the number of common factors. Without knowing the number of common factors, we are not able to identify the common factors. We use the Bai and Ng (2002) method to estimate the number of factors. 2 Before doing so, we standardize the panel data, which implies that we are using the correlation, rather than covariance, matrix. Bai and Ng (2002) proposed three information criteria based on the estimated eigenvalues from the covariance matrix. Let the loss function be
where N denotes the number of sample countries and r denotes the estimated number of common factors. Bai and Ng (2002) suggested the following Information Criteria (IC) with respect to r:
where min when we estimate the number of common factors. Later, we use IC3 to identify the determinants of the common factors, because we want a more conservative criterion when finding these determinants. Actual usage of these criteria is like the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) or Akaike information criterion (AIC): choose the maximum number of factors and then minimize the criteria. We set the maximum number to be six.
It is important to note that even 1 IC and 2 IC overestimate the number of factors when the idiosyncratic components have persistent serial dependence. In this case, filtering -pooled AR(1) or first difference -is required to estimate the number of factors; however, filtering nonpersistent data may result in overestimation. 3 We later show that filtering is unnecessary for transnational terrorism data, because the estimated number of common factors is always less than six.
In many periods, there are zero incidents of transnational terrorism for many of the sample countries. Excluding countries, where there is little transnational terrorism, increases the cross-sectional dependence, which promotes an accurate estimate of the factor number.
However, this exclusion may lose estimation robustness if too many countries are excluded. Consequently, we check results with various censored percentages. First, we define the index function it  for transnational terrorism as
which denotes the periods where there are one or more transnational terrorist attacks, so that the total frequency of terrorist attacks (i.e., periods with nonzero incidents) for country i is given by Once the number of common factors is determined, we then estimate the common factors and factor loadings by using principal component analysis. We construct a correlation matrix using Equation (1), so that the estimated T K  eigenvectors become the estimated common factors. The factor loading coefficients are then estimated from regressing transnational terrorism on a constant and the estimated common factors for each country. The coefficients on the estimated common factors are the factor loadings for the country.
B. Identifying the Common Factors
Common factor analysis has been used infrequently in economics because it does not provide any explanation for the underlying determinants of the common factor(s). Here, we identify the common factor by using a simple but intuitive method. When, e.g., a price leader sets the market price, the prices for the rest of the firms would be highly correlated with the leader's price. Similarly, we ask whether we can find a few core countries whose transnational terrorist incidents determine the common factor for worldwide transnational terrorism. Our thinking is that transnational terrorism is being driven or influenced by hot spots of terrorist activity.
Suppose that 1t
 is the most important driver of cross-sectional dependence in it   then the common factor model can be rewritten as
However, the problem is that we do not know which countries are the main drivers. In order to find the potential core determinant countries for the first common factor, we run
where m  is a subset of m potential countries responsible for 1 t F , which is the primary determinant for the co-movement of transnational terrorism; and r denotes the estimated number of common factors. We can estimate r, but we do not know the number of core countries, m.
Also, note that the true value of j  is zero, because the estimated first common factor must be independent of other common factors. However, we must project the influence of the other common factors on st  . Suppose that r = 1 and m = 1.  , and the transnational terrorist incidents in one additional country. We run 1 N  individual regressions and choose the second core country by minimizing SSR. We repeat this procedure several times to identify a few potential core countries that influence the common factor.
5 If r > 1, then the second term should be included in Equation (12). The next selection criterion narrows the set of potential core countries to the true core countries.
Next we exclude the first core country * 1t
 is the determinant of the first common factor, then the approximate factor model in Equation (3) can be rewritten as
 must not have any common factor. In other words, the projected residual ˆo it  should not have any cross-sectional dependence. If the number of factors is not estimated to be zero, then we include the second potential core country in Equation (3a), run the resulting equation
  , and test if the regression residuals have zero common factor. We continue with this procedure until the estimated number of factors becomes zero. If the estimated number of factors is zero, say after excluding the first three core countries, these three countries' transnational terrorism explains the overall cross-sectional dependence.
In sum, the whole procedure can be divided into four steps. In Step 1, the number of common factors is estimated.
Step 2 involves estimating the common factors by using principal component analysis. The potential core countries whose transnational terrorist incidents determine the common factor are then identified in Step 3. Finally, once the potential core countries are isolated, the final selection procedure verifies if the core countries are indeed responsive to the co-movement of transnational terrorism in the world (Step 4).
IV. DATA
Given our interest in identifying common and idiosyncratic determinants of countries' transnational terrorist attacks, we must rely on transnational terrorist event data. We draw our transnational terrorist data from International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE) dataset that records the incident date, country location, and other relevant observations. ITERATE was originally devised by Mickolus (1982) and recently updated by Mickolus et al. (2009) . We use transnational terrorist events throughout the world for to construct a balanced panel data set, which includes most of the relevant modern era of transnational terrorism, which began in 1968 (Hoffman, 2006) . Transnational terrorist incidents are generally identified by where they occurred (i.e., venue location) even when foreigners are killed. Thus, the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Lebanon on 23 October 1983 is a transnational terrorist incident in Lebanon. If there is more than one location -e.g., a skyjacking starting in France and ending in Spain, then we attribute the incident to its start location.
However, for letter and parcel bombs, the incident location is where the bomb explodes or ends up.
Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups against noncombatants to obtain political or social objectives through the intimidation of a large audience, beyond that of the immediate victims. Terrorist acts are violence with political or social motives; violent acts without such motives are criminal acts and do not count as terrorism. An attack used to finance a terrorist group's campaign to induce political or social change is counted as a terrorist event. Terrorists utilize various modes of attacks -bombings, hostage taking, assassinations, suicide bombings, arson, and armed assaults -to cajole a government into giving in to their political/social demands in response to public (audience) pressure.
Terrorism is further subdivided into two categories: domestic and transnational events. Domestic events involve perpetrators, victims, and audience from just the host or venue country.
In contrast, transnational terrorism concerns perpetrators, victims, or audience from two or more countries. A terrorist incident that ensues in one country and concludes in another -e.g., an international skyjacking or letter bombings -is a transnational incident. If the perpetrators plan the attack in one country and execute it in another, then the attack is a transnational terrorist incident. When the victims or perpetrators include nationalities other than that of the venue country, the incident is a transnational terrorist event. In short, transnational terrorist incidents impact the interests from at least two countries. By their nature transnational terrorism is more likely than domestic terrorism to display cross-sectional dependence.
ITERATE gathered its data on transnational terrorist incidents using a host of sources, including the Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters tickers, New York Times, Washington Post, the Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS) Daily Reports, ABC, NBC, and CBS evening news. Through 1996, the FBIS Daily Reports was an invaluable source for ITERATE; these reports drew from hundreds of world print and electronic media services in many languages. Table 1 displays the estimates of number of common factors for various nonzero thresholds and Information Criteria. Regardless of the threshold value, c, the number of factors is estimated to be one, based on IC1 and IC2. This is true for c values of 2 to 6, and all other thresholds greater than 6. When, e.g., c = 2, there are 106 countries with two or more periods of nonzero transnational terrorist attacks over the 38 sample years. Because the number of estimated factors is not dependent on the threshold value, the smallest threshold of 2 is chosen to estimate the common factor and factor loadings. 6 As we mentioned earlier and as displayed in Table 1 , IC3 overestimates the number of common factors to be four.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
[ Table 1 near here]
Next, we estimate the single common factor by using principal component analysis with standardized data. However, we note that the estimated common factor with standardized data is not that different than that with nonstandardized data, especially when c is moderately large with a value of 6. Hence, we use the standardized panel for the determination of the common factor in Step 2.
Before we proceed to
Step 3, we analyze how well the single common factor explains the variation of the transnational terrorism in each country. To be specific, we note that the variance of the transnational terrorism in country i, it  , can be decomposed into
 is the estimate of the common component and ˆo it  is the estimate of the idiosyncratic component for country i.
[ Table 2 near here] Table 2 displays the results of the variance decomposition of the common components.
We report the variances by regions (using the standard World Bank classification), and we also present the results for the countries with the five largest and five smallest variances. Because it  is standardized over time, its variance for each country is always equal to one. The larger values in Table 2 This is a fascinating result that has, heretofore, not been shown empirically. Thus, three regions respond more to a common driver of transnational terrorism than other regions. Given Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), al-Qaida, and many others (Hoffman, 2006; Mickolus et al., 1989 ; US Department of State, various years). France, Greece, Spain, and Austria have been the venue for many transnational terrorist incidents during the sample period. For completeness, Table A1 in the Appendix displays the 50 countries most influenced by the common factor. It is, however, quite interesting that a terrorism-ridden country like Colombia is not affected by a worldwide driver. This result agrees with Latin America being less influenced than some other regions by a common driver. Thus, Colombia is not reflecting what has motivated transnational terrorism in other hot spots -its brand of narco-terrorism apparently sets it apart. Next, we proceed to Step 3 to identify the potential common factors of transnational terrorism. In particular, we apply the following estimation strategy. We begin with m = 1 and run Equation (12)  along with other countries' transnational terrorist events, one country at a time. This involves N -1 individual regressions. Again, we choose the second core country that provides the highest 2 R . We repeat this procedure until m = 6. We later evaluate the optimal number of m. Table 3 presents the results for the potential determinants for the single common factor.
We consider six countries as a set of potential determinants. The principal component estimates are always normalized to identify the factor loadings and common factors; hence, the regression coefficients can always be rescaled. In other words, we do not say that a 1% increase in transnational terrorist events in Lebanon augments the worldwide terrorism by 0.03%. A more appropriate interpretation is as follows: for m = 2, around 80% of the variation in the common driver of the transnational terrorism can be explained by transnational terrorism in Lebanon and the United States. Furthermore, Lebanon's transnational terrorism affects worldwide comovement of terrorism by 20 percentage points more than that of the United States, because 0.03/(0.03 + 0.02) = 0.6 for Lebanon, whereas 0.02/0.05 = 0.4 for the United States -see Table   3 . The other important countries in terms of explaining global transnational terrorism are Germany, Iraq, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Iraq becomes an important driver after the US invasion in 2001. The negative association for Iraq in Table 3 arises because the deployment of US forces in Iraq absorbed much of the capacity of transnational terrorists to stage attacks.
[Table 3 near here]
It is important to note that all six countries may not be true determinants of the common factor of transnational terrorism. We, thus, proceed to Step 4. First, we construct a panel where Lebanon is deleted. That is, we check if Lebanon can explain the cross-sectional correlation for worldwide transnational terrorism. We isolate transnational terrorism in Lebanon from that in other countries and check if there is significant correlation in the residuals. Next, we ascertain whether the residuals do not contain any common factor. That is, (14) for Lebanon,
where t   denotes terrorism in Lebanon. The set of core-country determinants of the common factor is identified once the estimated number of factors becomes zero.
[ Table 4 near here] Table 4 contains the results. Evidently, if we use IC1 and IC2 only, then we can say that Lebanon explains all cross-sectional dependence for worldwide transnational terrorism. We also checked the set of core-country determinants with various threshold values of c, but the result does not change -Lebanese transnational terrorism drives worldwide transnational terrorism. If we utilize IC3, which typically overestimates number of factors and the number of core countries, then we can get four additional core countries -the United States, Germany, Iraq, and the United Kingdom. Using IC3 as our criterion for core countries, we get a result nearly identical to Table 3 , except for the exclusion of Italy as a core-country driver of the common
factor.
An understanding of the large pivotal place that Lebanon has assumed in the modern era of transnational terrorism is reflected by its 67% role as the common driver of global transnational terrorism. This Lebanese factor has previously gone unrecognized. There are many considerations potentially behind this ignominious distinction. Since the start of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, Lebanon has not had a strong government. Consequently, terrorist groups have trained and taken safe haven in Lebanon up to the present day (Alexander and Pluchinsky, 1992; Hoffman, 2006 Hezbollah's use of large-scale suicide car bombings in 1983 against the US embassy, the US Marine barracks, and the French Paratroopers sleeping quarters influenced similar attacks in Sri Lanka, Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and elsewhere (Bloom, 2005; Pape, 2005; Pedahzur, 2005) . Israeli short-term deportation of Hamas activists to southern Lebanon in December 1992 resulted in Hamas learning the art of suicide attacks from Hezbollah. These activists then returned to Israel where suicide attacks later ensued (Hoffman, 2006) . Another terrorist tactic in Lebanon that influenced transnational terrorism globally was the kidnapping of foreign aid workers, peacekeepers, academics, and diplomats for ransoms in the 1980s and 1990s. Reagan's administration "arms-for-hostage deal" for the release of Rev. Benjamin Weir,
Rev. Lawrence Jenco, and David Jacobsen resulted in the "Irangate" scandal that almost brought down the Reagan presidency and demonstrated to the rest of the world that even staunch supporters of the no-negotiation policy might renege. This resulted in increased hostage taking worldwide (Brandt and Sandler, 2009; Enders and Sandler, 2011; Mickolus et al., 1989) .
Lebanon also served as the launching point for transnational terrorist attacks against Israel, which led to Israeli invasions in 1978 Israeli invasions in , 1982 Israeli invasions in , and 2006 . These invasions subsequently sparked terrorist incidents worldwide (see, e.g., Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, 1994; Enders and Sandler, 2012) . Israeli terrorism does not play a role as a common driver of global transnational terrorism, insofar as, unlike Lebanon, most incidents in Israel are classified as domestic terrorism. Lebanon has also been the location of internecine conflict among terrorist factions -e.g., Fatah and ANO -that resulted in inter-group assassinations and attacks in
Lebanon and other parts of the world -e.g., the assassination of a Fatah leader in Tunisia.
US transnational terrorism is also a common driver because the Vietnam War fueled terrorist attacks in the United States and in Europe, where many left-wing groups (e.g., RAF, 17
November, and the Italian Red Brigades) operated. These groups not only protested the Vietnam War, but also alleged US imperialism and capitalism. Moreover, US actions in the Middle East angered many terrorist groups, leading to attacks on US soil (especially before 1990) and abroad.
In a recent paper, Savun and Phillips (2009) demonstrated that unpopular foreign policy action by countries is a root cause of transnational terrorism. This finding is consistent with the United
States being a driver of transnational terrorism with its presence in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. In addition, Dreher and Gassebner (2008) showed that countries that voted in line with the United States in the UN General Assembly faced a greater risk of transnational terrorism.
The German RAF served as a driver for transnational terrorism in Europe for almost 25
years. The RAF forged alliances with other groups -e.g., Direct Action in France -and cooperated with Palestinian terrorist groups (e.g., PFLP). The RAF operated in Germany, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (Alexander and Pluchinsky, 1992) . US military bases in Germany gave rise to many transnational terrorist attacks against US military personnel and dependents in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. Iraq's presence as a common driver of transnational terrorism is more recent, following the US invasion of Iraq. Our findings then suggest that this invasion brought a new common driver, as transnational terrorists gravitated to Iraq. This was clearly not the intention of the Bush administration. Finally, the United Kingdom also had a small influence as a common driver of transnational terrorism. In the United Kingdom, the Irish Republican Army's (IRA's) tactics of urban warfare influenced terrorists worldwide. The IRA also forged linkages with groups in Europe and the Middle East, thereby having an influence beyond its borders (Hoffman, 2006) .
Based on principal component analysis, Figure 1 displays the estimated common factor for transnational terrorism, and the fitted values for Lebanon (m = 1), Lebanon and the United States (m = 2), and Lebanon, the United States, and Germany (m = 3). The common factor is estimated in Figure 1 with nonstandardized data for two reasons. First, the estimated common factor with standardized data is heavily dependent on the choice of c. For small c, the estimated common factor with standardized data is more volatile, because the panel includes more zero observations. Second, when c is moderately large, say c = 6, the common factor's dependence on c is reduced and its estimated value is less influenced by standardization. To avoid such complications, we plot the estimated common factor without standardization. We normalize all four series in Figure 1 so that the variance of each series becomes unity; hence, standardized values are measured on the y-axis. From Table 3 , Lebanon and the United States explain around 80% of the variation in common factor and, together with Germany, the three countries explain around 92% of worldwide co-movement of transnational terrorism. Therefore, it is not surprising that, for the most part, the fitted values for three countries' transnational terrorism series coincide well with the estimated common factor series in Figure 1 . The almost perfect fit for 1993 is because Germany sustained 180 transnational terrorist attacks, which was 35% of such attacks worldwide. Germany suffered more attacks in 1993 than in any other sample year.
The only noticeable exception to this close fit is [2003] [2004] , after the initial phase of the "War on
Terror" when al-Qaida and its affiliated groups were stressed. As shown by the aggregate common factor curve, transnational terrorism first dropped and then started to recover as the fundamentalist terrorists apparently regrouped and adjusted to the new more guarded environment.
[ Figure 1 Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen may become the common drivers of transnational terrorism in the future as they serve as training bases and as the dispatch points for terrorists. This makes these seemingly far-away places the security concern of all countries whose assets -people or property -may be targeted by terrorists at home or abroad. Our analysis not only indicates where collective action is needed -namely, in those countries whose transnational terrorist campaigns influence such attacks worldwide (see Table 4 ) -but also which countries may stand to gain the most from this collective action. These participants should be those countries most affected by the common factor -see Tables 2 and A1 . Countries whose transnational terrorism is primarily affected by idiosyncratic factors have little to gain from such collective action.
Indicating the countries that have the most to gain from such collective action 9 is not the same as predicting whether or not such action will be taken. Countries have a marked proclivity to wait for the prime-target countries -e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom -to act against the terrorists. This free riding occurs because countries do not want to put their soldiers in harm's way or to draw new terrorist attacks in retaliation for proactive measures.
A similar principal component analysis can be applied to domestic terrorism. There is no theoretical reason why transnational and domestic terrorism will share the same drivers. In an initial analysis, we find Colombia to be the main driver of the common factor of domestic terrorism. Locating additional common factors and drivers for domestic terrorism is difficult owing to data concerns. Although a fuller analysis is planned for the future, it is interesting to note that a country -Colombia -whose transnational terrorism is almost entirely idiosyncratic is the main driver of domestic terrorism. so that the regression residuals do not have any common factor. 6 If c = 0, we would be including countries with no transnational terrorism in 38 years, These countries can display no cross-sectional dependencies. For c = 1, there is only one nonzero observation for some countries. Since the variance of the common factor has to be normalized, there must be at least two nonzero observations for determining the common factor.
7 Krueger (2007) indicated that a large number of "terrorist attacks" on oil pipelines in Colombia were really nonterrorist acts of sabotage by an oil pipeline repair company. This kind of recording error can also set Colombia apart from other countries facing a common driver of transnational terrorism.
